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This thesis examines how Naval Construction Forces (NCFs) Operating with 
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) receive sustainment support. Restructuring 
of the military forces, in particular the Marine Corps engineer units, has resulted in an 
increase in the mission-dependent general engineering support that the Seabees provide to 
MAGTFs. The Seabees have developed a robust initial sustainment capability that serves 
them well in independent operations, but that can be a significant liability when operating 
with MAGTFs. This thesis analyzes the impact this robust sustainment capability has on 
the Seabees when they deploy in support of MAGTFs in terms of mobility and footprint. 
The research shows that elimination of initial sustainment material from the Seabees can 
reduce the Aircraft Load (ACL) requirements for the four Navy Mobile Construction 
Battalions (NMCBs) notionally slated to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) by 
more than 46 C-141B ACLs. Additional savings can be realized by realigning the medical 
capability of the NMCBs to a configuration similar to a comparable Marine Corps 
engineer unit. This reconfiguration would save weight and space as well as allow the NCF 
to eliminate almost $5 million in medical equipment from its NMCBs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In reflecting on his experiences of World War II, 
Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith had 
this to say about the U.S. Navy Seabees: 
In my humble opinion the formation of the 
Seabees was one of the finest developments of this 
last war. The outstanding work of the Seabees and 
their magnificent courage in battle played a most 
important part in the successful prosecution of 
the war. It is not an unusual sight to witness 
the Seabees performing their duties under fire. 
It was an inspiring sight, for instance, to see 
them working on one end of the airfield while the 
Marines were fighting on the other end. The 
spirit of brotherhood existing between the Marines 
and the Seabees was forged in the holocaust of 
battle. Perhaps I can sum up this brief message 
in these few words, "THE SEABEES NEVER LET US 
DOWN." [Ref. 1] 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Naval Construction Force (NCF), frequently referred 
to as the Seabees, is a generic term applied to that group 
of deployable Naval organizations which provide numerous 
general engineering capabilities in support of the U.S. Navy 
and the U.S. Marine Corps. Among these capabilities are 
ship-to-shore construction support operations and military 
construction in support of MAGTF operations and amphibious 
assaults. 
Seabees and Marines have worked side by side in our 
nation's conflicts since the Seabees were first formed 
during World War II. LtGen Holland Smith's remarks 
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concerning the unique relationship between the U.S. Marine 
Corps and the sailors of the U.S. Navy's Naval Construction 
Force, made following World War II, remain true today. In 
fact, an effective argument can be made that the operational 
effectiveness of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) is 
even more dependant on the engineering functions performed 
by the Navy's Seabees now, than it was in LtGen Holland 
Smith's era. 
Several recent events have lead to a further 
strengthening of these historically strong ties between the 
Seabees and the U.S. Marine Corps. Recent contingencies 
have seen Seabees operating with MAGTFs in major operations 
in Southwest Asia and Somalia, and in numerous other smaller 
operations throughout the world. The recent downsizing of 
U.S. military forces, including the Marine Corps and the 
Navy, have resulted in a significant reduction of the Marine 
Corps' organic engineering capabilities. Doctrinal 
relationships that are now being refined (NWP 04.01/MCRP 4-
5.4 DRAFT) provide for the Seabees to contribute critical 
engineering capabilities that the Marine Corps' organic 
engineer units cannot provide. In particular, the Marine 
Corps ability to provide engineering support for 
expeditionary airfields and bridging requirements has been 
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virtually eliminated. These missions now fall directly on 
the shoulders of the Seabees. [Ref. 2] 
Additionally, continuing fiscal constraints and the 
emphasis on joint operations provide pressures for both the 
Marine Corps and the Navy to continue to explore and refine 
ways in which they can work together in the most effective 
and economical manner. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
Operational relationships between the Seabees and the 
Marine Corps continue to evolve and change. Among the 
primary areas of concern that must be resolved are the 
levels of each class of supply the Seabees will deploy with, 
and the manner in which sustainment for each of these 
classes of supply will be accomplished while operating with 
MAGTFs. Three areas in particular require careful 
consideration for potential refinement of doctrinal policy: 
organic medical capabilities, the level of embarked 
sustainment material and follow-on repair parts sustainment 
procedures. 
The organic medical capability of a Seabee battalion 
far exceeds that of a comparable Marine Corps engineer 
support battalion. Because Seabees have frequently deployed 
independently on missions requiring them to be essentially 
self supporting, their medical capability has evolved to 
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include ancillary medical equipment such as x-ray machines 
and surgical laboratories that duplicate services provided 
by the MAGTF's own medical units. These services are 
unnecessary within the structure of a general support 
battalion, and more importantly, they reduce the mobility of 
the Seabee units, create a larger footprint in their area of 
operations, and create a significant increase in their 
maintenance management burden. [Ref. 3] 
Additionally, the number of days of supply the Seabees 
deploy with is different than the days of supply the MAGTF 
deploys with. The greatest difference occurs among repair 
parts. Seabees currently deploy with a 60-day stock of 
repair parts, and submit requisitions for required 
replacements directly from themselves through their 
established U.S. Navy supply chain. Marine Corps doctrine 
calls for a MAGTF to deploy with 30 days of supply of repair 
parts, and utilize a MAGTF established supply chain. The 
Seabee process bypasses the deployed MAGTF supply chain. 
These policies have several deleterious effects. For 
example, they effectively deny the Seabees the opportunity 
to benefit from the potential common item support the MAGTF 
could provide1 • They also require the Seabees to deploy 
1 
Common item support refers to like items that are shared by both 
the Seabees and the Marine Corps. 
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with a greater footprint and cause a corresponding reduction 
in the Seabee units mobility. In addition they do not allow 
the Seabees to benefit from MAGTF prioritization of their 
requisitions and they create the additional burden of 
establishing a separate supply sustainment chain for Seabee 
required items. 
Eliminating these areas of common item overlap and 
utilizing the established MAGTF supply chain could result in 
several potential benefits: reduction of the mount-out 
logistics burden on the deploying Seabee unit; increased 
responsiveness in support of common item requisitions; 
decrease in the Seabee units footprint; reduction in the 
maintenance burden of excess equipment and parts; increase 
in the Seabee units mobility in the area of operations; 
reduction in the financial burden of stock management; 
management efficiencies gained through utilization of a 
single, common logistics chain into the area of operations 
for the Seabees and MAGTF; and Seabee requisitions being 
prioritized in accordance with MAGTF priorities vice 
competing with fleet priorities. 
The objective of this research is to evaluate the 
levels of stock in all classes of supplies that the Seabees 
deploy with, and to additionally examine the present 
processes for providing supply sustainment to Seabees 
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deployed with MAGTFs. The emphasis is on examining areas 
where unnecessary redundancy occurs. Additionally, the 
research examines the Seabees methods of supply sustainment 
to identify potential improvements in effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
This thesis initially examines the level of sustainment 
the Seabees plan to deploy with across each class of supply, 
and then examines how the Seabees plan to obtain sustainment 
support in all classes of supply. The thesis then looks at 
alternative processes and procedures that provide the 
potential to enhance the supply support received by the 
Seabees when they are deployed with MAGTFs. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question that is addressed in this 
thesis is: How can sustainment support for the Seabees 
serving with MAGTFs be provided in the most responsive 
manner while enhancing the mobility of the Seabees and 
minimizing the logistics footprint ashore? 
Subsidiary research questions addressed in each chapter 
are as follows: 
1. Chapter I 
a. What is the critical role that the Seabees 
fulfill in USMC requirements for heavy 
engineering support? 
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b. What does the future hold for this 
relationship considering downsizing of the 
military forces, increased emphasis on joint 
operations, and increased tempo of 
operations? 
c. What areas of supply sustainment for Seabees 
in support of MAGTFs can be improved to 
enhance the MAGTFs accomplishment of its 
mission? 
2. Chapter II 
a. What are the historical relationships for 
Seabee support of MAGTF operations? 
b. How are the Seabees organized in support of 
MAGTFs? 
c. What doctrinal guidelines direct the 
operational relationship between the Seabees 
and supported MAGTFs? 
3. Chapter III 
a. What guides the Seabees in the days of supply 
they deploy with for MAGTF operations? 
b. What level of days of supplies do equivalent 
Marine Corps battalions deploy with for MAGTF 
operations? 
c. How do the Seabees intend to receive 
sustainment for each class of supply while 
deployed with MAGTFs? 
d. What lessons can be learned from recent 
operations concerning Seabee requirements for 
sustainment support while deployed with 
MAGTFs? 
e. Are changes in sustainment support for 
Seabees deployed with MAGTFs advantageous? 
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4. Chapter IV 
a. What alternative procedures exist that could 
improve sustainment support for Seabees 
deployed with MAGTFs? 
b. What alternative processes exist that could 
improve sustainment support for Seabees 
deployed with MAGTFs? 
c. What changes in doctrine could be made to 
improve sustainment support for Seabees 
deployed with MAGTFs? 
d. How easily can recommended changes in 
procedures, processes and doctrine be 
adopted? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis concentrates on improving the sustainment 
support for Seabees deployed with MAGTFs. In addition to 
research of doctrinal publications and other reference 
material, the thesis is based on interviews with members of 
the following organizations: Third Naval Construction 
Brigade at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and Port Hueneme, 
California; Second Naval Construction Brigade at Little 
Creek, Virginia; and First Marine Expeditionary Force at 
Camp Pendleton, California. While it primarily examines the 
relationship between the Third Naval Construction Brigade 
and the First Marine Expeditionary Force, the expected 
benefits of the recommendations contained herein should 
apply to the relationship between other Marine Expeditionary 
Forces and their supporting Seabees. 
8 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis and 
the problem of sustainment support that is explored in the 
following chapters. Chapter II looks at the history of 
Seabee support of Marine Forces, with special emphasis on 
the development of doctrine and policy. Chapter III 
examines by class of supply how the Seabees deploy, and are 
then sustained when serving with MAGTFs. Chapter IV 
discusses alternative procedures, processes and doctrine 
that can be adopted to enhance sustainment support for the 
Seabees. Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations 
and suggested areas for further study. 
9 
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II. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE SUPPORT 
OF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 
A. OPERATIONAL HISTORY 
1. World War II -- Birth of the Seabees 
The U.S. Navy created its Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) in 
1842, as a part of its Bureau of Yards and Docks. In the 
100 years that followed, the Navy depended on these CEC 
officers and civilian contractors for construction support. 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the use of 
civilian labor in war zones became impractical. 
International law prohibited civilians from lawfully 
resisting enemy military attack and resistance on the part 
of the civilians could result in their summary execution as 
guerrillas. [Ref. 4] 
At the outset of WWII, the U.S. Navy had more than 
70,000 civilians under contract outside of the continental 
United States. On 23 December 1941, a 1,200 man 
construction crew on Wake Island was captured. More than 50 
civilians were killed, with the survivors shipped to China 
to spend the remainder of the war as military prisoners. As 
a consequence of this event, morale of the civilian 
contractors was very poor. In response, VAdm Ben Moreell, 
Chief of Civil Engineers of the Navy, requested authority to 
enlist men into the Navy for construction duty. 
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On 5 January 1942, the Bureau of Navigation authorized 
him to recruit men from the construction trades for 
assignment to a Naval Construction Regiment composed of 
three Naval Construction Battalions [Ref. 4]. "In less than 
a month (February 1942) the first unit was deployed to Bora 
Bora, Tahiti, to build a fuel tank farm." [Ref. 5] The 
Seabees recognize 5 March 1942 as their birth date, the date 
they adopted "Seabees" as their official name. "Seabees" 
was derived from a transliteration of the initial letters of 
Construction Battalion, or "CB." 
More than 10,000 CEC officers and 240,000 enlisted 
personnel served with the Seabees in its Pacific campaigns. 
Most of them served in naval construction battalions that 
were components of the five Marine engineer regiments 
deployed to the Pacific from 1942 to 1944. [Ref 1] 
Throughout the war, the Seabees built 
hundreds of airfields from the jungle for Navy and 
Marine aviators, set up galleys to feed Marines 
ashore, built base camps and created harbors and 
ports where none should have existed .... Seabee 
support of Marine combat elements was replicated 
throughout the Pacific campaign. Seabees created 
the infrastructure that enabled the Navy/Marine 
Team to island hop all the way to Okinawa. [Ref. 
5] 
The years following WWII found the Seabees continuing 
their construction efforts as they helped repair and rebuild 
the war-torn Pacific island countries. 
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2. Korea -- Reorganization of the Seabees 
Korea found the Seabees once again performing vital 
wartime support. At the Inchon landing in September of 1950 
they assisted the amphibious assault by positioning critical 
pontoon causeways while under continuous enemy fire. 
Seabees also served in numerous detachments formed to 
provide engineering support for the many expeditionary 
airfields of the Marine Air Groups (MAGs). 
Korea also saw completion of a basic reorganization of 
the Seabees. Two distinct types of battalions were 
established to provide for specialization and mobility. 
Amphibious Construction Battalions (PHIBCBs) were formed to 
place causeways, construct pontoon docks and perform other 
functions necessary for landing personnel and equipment in 
the shortest possible time. The Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalions (NMCBs) were formed to provide for land 
construction of a wide variety which includes military 
camps, roads, bridges, tank farms, airstrips, and docking 
facilities. [Ref. 4] The Seabees of today are organized in 
this manner. 
In the years following Korea, the Seabees concentrated 
more on building than they did fighting. Seabees were 
involved in construction projects around the globe, 
including missile ranges in both the Atlantic and Pacific 
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and military housing complexes all over the world. In 
response to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 Seabees hastily 
constructed and helped man a formidable defensive perimeter 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
3. Vietnam Era 
Vietnam found the Seabees and Marines once again thrust 
into battle together. The Seabees not only provided combat 
engineering support, such as reconstructing two vitally-
needed concrete bridges during the Tet Offensive [Ref. 1] 
but they were heavily involved in civic action projects as 
well. These civic action projects paved roads between farms 
and markets, drilled fresh water wells, and constructed 
numerous schools, hospitals, utility systems, and other 
community facilities. 
Other fundamental activities also took root. Seabees 
were often integrated with Marines into perimeter security. 
Perhaps of even more importance to the individual Marine, 
the Seabees had what was generally recognized as the best 
refrigeration units in Vietnam, and those units often became 
the best morale, welfare and recreation available to those 




The years following Vietnam found the Seabees once 
again returning to peacetime building projects, including 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Guam. More 
significantly, in recent years the Seabees have found 
themselves once again operating closely with their Marine 
counterparts. More than 5,000 Seabees served in Southwest 
Asia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 
Saudi Arabia they built 10 camps housing more than 42,000 
personnel, 14 galleys capable of feeding 75,000 people, and 
6 million square feet of aircraft parking apron. [Ref. 5] 
During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Seabees from 
two NMCBs provided support ranging from construction and 
improvement of base camps, Main Supply Routes (MSRs), and 
airfields for American and combined forces, as well as their 
usual civic action projects. It was the author's 
observation of the Seabees in Somalia that provided the 
inspiration for this thesis. 
B. MISSION OF THE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE (NCF) 
The NCF is a responsive, mobile, modern, versatile 
engineer force, capable of accomplishing diverse tasks. 
These tasks range from timber bunker construction in a 
forward ground combat environment to construction and 
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operation of an advanced industrial facility in support of 
naval operating forces and the logistics pipeline. [Ref. 6] 
The Naval Construction Force (Seabees) provide the 
following capabilities to the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine 
Corps, and when directed, other agencies of the U.S. 
government: 
1. Responsive military advance base construction 
support including construction, maintenance, and 
operation of operational, logistics, underwater, 
ship-to-shore, shore, and deep ocean facilities. 
2. Military construction in support of MAGTF 
operations. 
3. Defensive and limited offensive operations against 
overt or clandestine enemy attacks directed toward 
unit personnel, convoys, camps, and facilities 
under construction. 
4. Amphibious assault and ship-to-shore construction 
support operations. 
5. Battle damage repair operations. 
6. Disaster control and recovery operations. 
7. Civic action employment. 
As a result of recent revisions of doctrine, the 
Seabees are now responsible for two critical combat 
engineering-related missions for the MAGTFs: development of 
aviation support facilities, especially expansion of 
Expeditionary Airfields (EAFs) through construction of 
aircraft aprons; and relocation of tactical, fixed-panel 
bridging assets to forward areas of the battle field for 
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redeployment by Marine forces after the construction of 
permanent (non-standard) bridges [Ref 2]. Appendix A 
provides all of the engineering tasks, capabilities, and 
sources of support for engineer units assigned to a MEF 
sized MAGTF. The successful accomplishment of future MAGTF 
missions will be directly dependant on the successful 
accomplishment of these subsidiary missions. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF NCF UNITS ASSIGNED TO MAGTFS 
NCF units are tasked, organized, and employed to 
support MAGTF operations as required. Figure 2-1 
illustrates an NCR structured to support a MEF. 
NCR 
---- Re more itlg El.em.erd'. Com:nmd E.em.e:rJt Off Eh1 
12 .52 
---- -----I 
NCFSU NMCB NMCB 
O:ff Eh1 Off Ehl. "' Off Ehl 12 202 24 145 24 14.5 
NMCB NMCB 
Off Eh1 1- O:II Eh1 
24 14.5 24 14.5 
Figure 2-1, Notional Naval Construction Regiment 
From NWP 4-04.1/MCRP 4-5.4 
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A full Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) will normally 
be supported by a Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) 
consisting of at least two Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalions (NMCBs) and a Naval Construction Force Support 
Unit (NCFSU). [Ref. 1] 
1. Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) Command Element 
(CE) 
The NCR CE is the command and control organization for 
the NCR. The NCR CE is normally commanded by a Navy Civil 
Engineer Corps (CEC) Captain. The CE is organized into the 
following departments: Executive, Administrative, 
Intelligence, Operations, Supply, and Training. [Ref. 1] 
2. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 
The NMCB consists of a headquarters company, equipment 
company, shops and utilities company, and two general 
construction companies. An NMCB is normally commanded by a 
Navy CEC Commander, and usually functions as an integral 
unit. NMCBs can function as integral units of the NCR, or 
independently as a separate unit. Eighty-five percent of an 
NMCB is capable 'of deploying as an Air Echelon via strategic 
airlift requiring approximately 87 C-141 or 30 C-5 
equivalent lifts. The remaining fifteen percent must follow 
via sealift in the Sea Echelon. Figure 2-2 shows the 
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Figure 2-2. Organization of a Naval Mobile 
Construction Battalion From NWP 4-04.1/MCRRP 4-5.4 
DRAFT 
3. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) Air 
Detachment (Air DET) 
An Air DET is a task-organized advance element of the 
NMCB whose capabilities include all of the general 
engineering capabilities of the NMCB. An Air DET typically 
consists of a headquarters section, a support section, a 
horizontal construction section, and a vertical construction 
section. The typical organization of an Air DET is shown in 
Figure 2-3. Normally commanded by a U.S. Navy CEC 
Lieutenant, it is usually composed of 89 personnel and 38 
pieces of civil engineer support equipment. It is limited 
to 250 to 300 short tons consisting of approximately 14 C-






I I I 
Support HorizCoot V ertComt 
Section Section Section 
Figure 2-3. Organization of the NMCB 
Air Detachment From 
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4. Naval Construction Force Support Unit (NCFSU) 
An NCFSU is normally commanded by a U.S. Navy CEC 
Commander. The mission of an NCFSU is to provide 
augmenting, logistics-oriented construction support for an 
NCR and up to four NMCBs. The NCFSU is organized into four 
sections: administrative services, equipment management, 
engineering support, and logistics. Figure 2-4 illustrates 
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Figure 2-4. Organization of a Naval Construction 
Force Support Unit From NWP 4-04.1/MCRP 4-5.4 
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5. Underwater Construction Team (UCT) 
UCTs are not routinely assigned to MAGTFs. The mission 
of the UCT is to provide additional engineering capabilities 
for the construction, inspection, and repair of ocean 
facilities. A UCT is normally commanded by a Navy CEC 
Lieutenant Commander and is designed to be self-sufficient 
in numerous underwater construction tasks. Figure 2-5 
depicts the organization of a UCT. MAGTF commanders 
requiring UCT capabilities in specific operations must 
request them from the cognizant Naval Beach Group (NBG) 





Figure 2-5. Organization of an 
Underwater Construction Team 
From NWP 4-04.1/MCRP 4-5.4 
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D. DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE 
1. Terms of Reference (TOR) 
While the historical relationship of Seabees supporting 
Marine MAGTFs is well established, formal doctrinal guidance 
has been much slower to evolve. In was not until 1987 that 
senior representatives of the Navy and Marine Corps 
officially began to develop a doctrinal basis for Seabee 
support of MAGTF operations. This initial agreement, signed 
by LtGen J. J. Went, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Installations and Logistics and VADM T. J. Hughes, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) is called the 
Terms of Reference (TOR) . The TOR provided general areas of 
understanding concerning NCF support during MAGTF operations 
and outlined specific tasks and responsibilities. 
The objective of the TOR was to achieve a coordinated 
program to ensure full and effective utilization of NCF 
capabilities when supporting MAGTFs. [Ref. 6] 
The TOR established that Seabee units supporting MAGTFs 
would be under the Operational Control (OPCON) 2 of the MAGTF 
commander. Also, for the first time, the TOR provided 
2 
Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of 
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing 
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It does 
not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or 
matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit 
training. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
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policy concerning responsibility for sustainment for each 
class of supply for Seabee units operating with MAGTFs. 
After depletion of NCF deployed supply stocks, the MAGTF was 
made responsible to provide resupply for Class I 
(subsistence), Class III (petroleum, oils and lubricants), 
Class IV (construction and barrier materials), Class V 
(ammunition), Class VI (personal demand items) and Class 
VIII (medical material). The agreements within the TOR were 
proven successful during Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm when four NMCBs, the major portions of a fifth NMCB, a 
NCR CE, a UCT Air DET and a detail from a NCFSU were 
assigned to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I 
MEF). [Ref. 1] 
2. FMFM 13-4/NWP 22-9 
However, there was concern during Operation Desert 
Storm and Desert Shield that operational commanders for both 
the NCF and the Marine Corps were insufficiently aware of 
the operational relationships between the NCF and the MAGTF 
that the TOR provided. FMFM 13-4/NWP 22-9 was published on 
9 August 1991 to provide clarification of the operational 
doctrine between NCFs and MAGTFs. The manual was a joint 
effort by doctrinal sponsors from the U.S. Marine Corps and 
the U.S. Navy and is the current doctrinal basis for the 
integration, coordination, and employment of various 
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components of the NCF under the operational control of a 
MAGTF. 
3. NWP 4-04.1/MCRP 4-5.4 (DRAFT) 
FMFM 13-4/NWP 29-9 and the TOR were both used to 
provide a doctrinal basis for Seabees in support of a MAGTF 
during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. NWP 4-04.1/MCRP 
4-5.4 is a publication that is now in the final draft stages 
and is intended to further improve the NCF and MAGTF 
commanders' understanding of the NCF's mission when 
supporting MAGTF operations. The primary areas of emphasis 
in the new publication are doctrinal procedures and 
structures that have been adopted to enhance the 
interoperability between the U.S. Marine Corps and the NCF. 
Additionally, this publication will provide planners and 
commanders for both the Marine Corps and the Navy extensive 
information on the tasks, roles, and capabilities of all of 
the engineering components of the MAGTF. [Ref. 1] 
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III. CURRENT SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT PRACTICES FOR 
NCF IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF OPERATIONS 
A. SEABEE SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTS 
Seabee planning concepts for deployment originated from 
their earliest experiences in World War II when it was 
recognized that significant savings could be made in both 
time and resources if units of personnel, equipment and 
material were standardized. Because NMCBs were frequently 
required to deploy to remote locations without any readily 
available source of sustainment, a substantial initial 
organic sustainment capacity was built into standard unit 
deployment planning as well. While the standardization of 
unit deployment configurations and a robust initial organic 
sustainment capacity have significant advantages for 
deployments to remote locations, they can be significant 
liabilities when deploying to areas where sustainment chains 
are already established. 
1. Standardization 
The Seabees quest for standardization of personnel, 
equipment and material led them to develop a modular system 
now called the Advanced Base Functional Component (ABFC) 
System. The ABFC system is a preplanned listing of required 
quantities of personnel, facilities, material and equipment 
required to perform specific emergency support missions or 
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functions. Functional components are designated by 
unclassified letter and number combinations. For example, 
P-29 is the functional component designation for an NCR and 
P-25 is the functional component designation for an NMCB. 
Each functional component and its associated facilities and 
assemblies are detailed to the national stock number (NSN) 
level. This method allows the Seabees to expediently and 
precisely communicate the specific requirements of an ABFC 
for a specific mission. [Ref. 7] 
Each NCF unit within the module is supported by a Table 
of Allowance (TOA) that provides the equipment and material 
the unit requires to perform one of the specific tasks of an 
advanced base. The actual construction of an advanced base 
is one of these tasks, and the TOA for each of the NMCBs is 
designed for that purpose. Missions beyond the scope of the 
equipment and material provided by the NMCB's TOA require 
augmentation by some other specifically developed TOA. For 
major operational contingencies with MAGTFs, the Seabees 
plan to deploy with TOAs designed to support the 
construction of an advanced base. If missions require 
materials and equipment not in the ABFC TOAs, the Seabees 
require augmentation from other specially developed TOAs. 
Table 3-1 shows the NCF modular concept as it applies to a 




NCF Unit Officers Enlisted (CESE) 
P-29 (NCR) 11 44 20 
P-31 (NCFSU) 12 202 433 
P-25 (NMCB) 24 738 263 
P-25 (NMCB) 24 738 263 
P-25 (NMCB) 24 738 263 
P-25 (NMCB) 24 738 263 
Total-One 119 3198 1505 
NCF Module 
Table 3-1. NCF Module in Support of MEF 
2. Organic Sustainment in Initial Stages 
Original Seabee planning considerations recognized that 
they were not likely to be able to benefit from established 
sources of sustainment in the remote areas where they were 
expected to be constructing advance bases. In response, the 
Seabees built an initial organic sustainment allowance into 
their TOAs. [Ref. 7] 
This planning has led to exceptionally robust TOAs that 
support virtually any contingency situation the Seabees 
might find themselves involved in. The downside is that 
this robustness exacts a heavy price by increasing both the 
unit's embarkation lift requirement and its footprint. 
These factors correspondingly degrade the battalion's 
27 
mobility during deployment and again upon arrival in the 
area of operations. [Ref. 8] 
Additionally, many of the sustainment items require 
exceptional management because of their special 
characteristics. Items included in the TOAs that have 
special characteristics include explosives and other 
hazardous material (batteries and petroleum products) and 
shelf life items such as medicine and food. Since these 
items cannot be easily prepackaged and staged for 
contingencies, they cause additional extraordinary effort by 
the units as they prepare to deploy for contingency 
situations. [Ref. 8] 
The end result is that when units need to concentrate 
on preparation of operations orders, personnel and major end 
items (civil engineering support equipment), they are also 
heavily involved in locating, collecting and preparing for 
embark numerous sustainment related commodities that require 
exceptional handling. While these sustainment related items 
are critical in a resource-austere environment, they become 
a burden to Seabee units operating with MAGTFs because the 
MAGTF will already have a reliable sustainment chain 
established prior to the Seabee's arrival. [Ref. 8] 
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B. SUSTAINMENT PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
MAGTFS 
Sustainment planning for Seabees in support of MAGTFs 
originated with the TOR in 1987. The TOR established levels 
of days of supply (DOS) that the Seabees would deploy with, 
and also the responsibility for sustainment of Seabee units 
operating with MAGTFs. 
Under current planning guidance, the Seabees receive 
sustainment from three sources when under OPCON of MAGTFs: 
from the embarked materials they deploy with; from the 
Marine Corps for Class I, Class III, Class IV, Class V (W), 
Class VI and Class VIII items after depletion of their 
deployed stocks; and from the Navy for Class IX items after 
depletion of deployed stock [Ref. 6]. Appendix B, derived 
from FMFM 4-1 [Ref. 9] provides a description for all of the 
classes of supply. Table 3-2 indicates the level of 
sustainment for each class of supply the Seabees deploy 
with, the expected days of supply they deploy with, and the 
agency responsible for providing sustainment after the 
Seabees deplete their deployed stocks. These classes of 
supply include Class VII items, which the Marine Corps 
refers to as "major end items" for which the nearest Seabee 
equivalent is "Civil Engineering Support Equipment" (CESE). 
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Embarked Days of Supply 
Air Air Echelon Res~onsible 
Supplies Detachment Sus ainment 
Agency 
Class I 5 5 Marine (Subsistence) Corps 
Class II Not (Individual 0 60 Addressed 
Equipment) 
Class III (Petroleum, 5 3 Marine 
Oils and Corps 
Lubricants) 
Class IV Advanced Advanced (Construction Base Based Marine 
Material) Construction Construction Corps Only Only 
Class V (W) 5 15 Marine (Ammunition) Corps 
Class VI Not Not Marine (Personal Addressed Addressed Corps 
Demand Items) 
Class VII 36 Pieces of 114 Pieces Navy 
(Mafor End CESE of CESE 
I ems) 
Class VIII Not Not Marine (Medical) Addressed Addressed Corps 
Class IX (Repair 30 
Parts) 
60 Navy 
Class X (Material to Not Not Requesting 
Sup~ort Applicable Applicable Agency 
nonrru. ita~ 
programs) 
Table 3-2. Susta1nrnent Support by Class of Supply 
C. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICES 
While current sustainment planning considerations 
ensure that the Seabee units are exceptionally well prepared 
for any contingency they might find themselves independently 
operating in, there are two significant areas that provide 
potential for improvement: Decreased footprint and increased 
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mobility through reduction or elimination of the embarkation 
of sustainment related items, and utilization of the MAGTF 
supply system for common item sourcing of Class IX items 
(repair parts) . 
1. Heavy Embarkation Lift Penalty 
Seabee units incur a significant penalty when deploying 
with their prescribed sustainment load. Table 3-3 below 












container/ Weight Cubic 
Personnel sixcon CESE (short meters Cost 
tons) 
89 11/9 36 471 1,197 $2,789,426 
650 86/36 114 2,258 7,388 $16,327,427 
24 7/0 99 1,647 4,066 $7,949,725 
763 107/45 249 3,051 12,689 $26,966,578 
Table 3-3. NMCB TOA After Seabee Log~st~cs 
Agency Training Guide Series Module #2 
Table 3-4 illustrates the amount of this lift 
requirement that is dedicated for each class of supply. 
With the exception of Class VII, (Major End Items/CESE) and 
some components of Class VIII (Medical), this depicts the 
amount of lift dedicated solely to sustainment. 
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As Table 3-4 shows, the total sustainment load fo.r one 
NMCB is almost 620,000 pounds, excluding ammunition which 
was not included because of its classified status, and 
repair parts which were not included because of the 
inability to discern weight attributable to items available 
from common item support. Most significantly, more than 
530,000 pounds of the sustainment items are designated to be 
airlifted into the area of operations with either the Air 
DET or the Air Echelon. 
Table 3-5 illustrates that the additional burden these 
sustainment items place on the Seabee's strategic airlift 
requirements is considerable. Considering that a minimum of 
four [Ref. 1] NMCBs are designated to support a MEF, the 
logistical burden placed upon an NCR in support of a MEF to 
embark its initial sustainment capability is significant. 
Embarkation lift requirement is critical. The heavier 
an organization is, the less mobile it is. Weight will 
magnify the difficulty a unit experiences in being 
transported to an area of operations, and severely 
diminishes its tactical ability to maneuver and operate once 
it arrives in its area of operations. [Ref. 10] 
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Class Air DET (P25A) Air Echelon (P25C) Sea Echelon (P25D) 
of 
Supply Sust. % of Tot. Sust. % of Sust. % of 
Lift Lift Lift Tot. Lift Tot. 
Reqmt. Reqmt. Reqmt. Lift Reqmt. Lift 
Reqmt. Reqmt. 
I 3,239 . 3 52,513 1.2 Not Not 
lbs. lbs. Planned Planned 
II 556 .06 102,239 2.3 16,842 . 5 
lbs. lbs. lbs. 
III 46,514 4.9 237,401 5.3 Not Not 
lbs. lbs. Planned Planned 
IV 24,908 2.6 53,380 1.2 67,904 2.1 
lbs. lbs. lbs. 
v3 Class. Class. Class. Class. Class. Class. 
VI Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned 
VII Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not 
Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply 
VIII4 1,698 .2 10,991 .2 Not Not 
lbs. lbs. Planned Planned 
IX Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
X Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not 
Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply 
TOTAL 76,915 8.2% 456,524 10.1% 84,746 2.6% 
lbs. lbs. lbs. 
Table 3-4. Susta1nment L1ft Requirements by Class of Supply 
In reality, the extreme airlift requirements for a 
Seabee battalion will probably result in only their Air 
Detachment (Air DET) being airlifted into the area of 
operation. Both the Air Echelon and Sea Echelon will most 
3 
Ammunition data is classified information. 
Most, but not all, of the Class VIII materials can be removed 
without affecting the mission. See section III.3.3 for discussion. 
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likely be relegated to sea transport. This factor alone 
provides incentive to find ways to reduce the weight of the 
Seabee lift requirements. [Ref. 8] 
I Aircraft Type I c-130 I C-141B I c-SB I 
Peacetime Aircraft Load (ACL) 25,000 lbs. 46,000 lbs. 130,000 lbs 
ACLs required for one NMCBs 21.3 11.6 4.9 
sustainment material 
ACLs required for four NMCBs 85.2 46.4 16.4 
sustainment material 
Table 3-5 ACLs Required for NMCBs Sustainment Material 
In the Seabees case, they not only have to arrange for 
embarkation of numerous classes of sustainment items that 
require special handling, but they have to handle the items 
numerous times as they prepare to deploy, when they arrive 
in their area of operations, and potentially several 
additional times as they establish their base camp. While 
many of their major end items (CESE) are generally self-
transportable, all items of sustainment require multiple 
movements and handling (in the case of many of the 
sustainment items, special handling) before they are 
ultimately consumed. [Ref. 8] 
The impact of the lift penalty imposed by embarking 
sustainment material is graphically evident when aircraft 
lift requirements are compared to the peacetime aircraft 
lift planning factors for each of the major strategic lift 
aircraft. 
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Table 3-5 illustrates how the lift capabilities of each 
of the major strategic lift aircraft pales in comparison to 
the substantial lift requirements for one NMCBs sustainment 
material. While the peacetime aircraft load (ACL) for 
preliminary load planning may be increased in wartime, there 
are many contingencies the Seabees might deploy to before 
required wartime waivers are granted. 
Considering that C-5Bs are a very limited asset, it is 
unlikely that any would be made available to support Seabee 
lift requirements. The expected airlift mix would be a 
combination of C-130 and C-141B aircraft. Accordingly, the 
number of individual aircraft required just to support 
initial NMCB sustainment probably lies somewhere between the 
45 aircraft that would be required if all lifts are made by 
C-141Bs, and the 82 aircraft required if all lifts are made 
by C-130s. 
At a time when strategic lift will be at a premium, its 
use to support any individual units sustainment is 
questionable. Depending on already established sustainment 
chains provided by a MAGTF that is already receiving 
sustainment from a combination of host nation support, 
Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons (MPS), Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) vessels and airlift seems much more 
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appropriate than utilizing limited strategic airlift to 
support the Seabees initial sustainment. 
Requiring Seabees to bring sustainment material with 
them when involved in MAGTF operations greatly degrades 
their preparations, embarkation and employment upon arrival, 
without any enhancement of their ability to perform their 
required missions. [Ref. 8] 
The end result is that the effort required to collect, 
embark and store these sustainment items is unnecessary when 
operating with MAGTFs because a reliable sustainment chain 
will have already been established before the Seabees 
arrive. 
2. Footprint 
The Seabees pay a severe penalty for the increased 
footprint that the large quantities of sustainment material 
create. Footprint needs to be considered both in the space 
it takes up during the embarkation phase, and also in the 
space the material occupies once the Seabees arrive in the 
area of operations. As Table 3-6 shows, more than 27% of 
the cubic feet of an Air Detachment's (Air DET) embarkation 
and slightly more than 20% of the cubic feet of an Air 
Echelon's embarkation must be devoted to sustainment items. 
Upon arrival in the area of operations and once this 
equipment is staged for access and not just storage, the 
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footprint increases even further. Each of the categories of 
sustainment items requires significant space simply to store 
and manage. Instead of just establishing a base camp, the 
Seabees also have to establish places to manage rations, 
petroleum, oils, lubricants, ammunition, construction 
materials, medical resources (x-ray, surgical, dental), and 
common item repair parts that can be made available from the 
MAGTF. 
Management of these sustainment items detracts from the 
Seabees preparation for their mission. When the NMCB is 
least prepared to manage sustainment material is the very 
same time when they are required to devote the most 
resources to the management of them. Instead of being able 
to outwardly focus on their mission, the NMCBs are forced to 
deal with the internal management of the considerable amount 
of sustainment material they have brought with them. [Ref. 
8] 
In some cases, the situation lessens as the sustainment 
items, such as food and petroleum products, are consumed and 
the Seabees begin using the MAGTF sustainment resources. In 
other cases the Seabees may well find themselves with 
unmanageable quantities of items such as explosives and 
ammunition, and therefore would require coordination with 
the MAGTF for storage purposes. [Ref. 11] 
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Class Air DET (P25A) Air Echelon (P25C) Sea Echelon (P25D) 
of 
Supply Cubic % of Cubic % of Cubic % of 
Feet Tot. _Feet Tot. Feet Tot. 
Reqmt. Lift Reqmt. Lift Reqmt. Lift 
Reqmt. Reqmt. Reqmt. 
I 126 1.2 1,901 2.9 Not Does Not 
Planned Apply 
II 26 .24 752 1.1 2,826 Does Not 
Apply 
III 1,824 17 8,622 13.1 Not Does Not 
Planned Apply 
IV 840 7.8 1,080 1.6 1,194 Does Not 
Apply 
v Class. Class. Class. Class. Class. Does Not 
Apply 
VI Not Not Not Not Not Does Not 
Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned Apply 
VII Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not 
Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply 
VIII 171 1.6 1,100 1.7 Not Does Not 
Planned Apply 
IX Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
X Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not 
Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply Apply 
TOTAL 2,987 27.7% 13,455 20.5% 2,945 Does Not 
Apply 
Table 3-6. Susta1nment Space Requ1rements by Class of 
Supply 
Reliance on the MAGTF for sustainment immediately (with 
the exception of non-common Class IX repair parts) would 
allow the Seabees to greatly reduce their footprint, and 
concentrate their resources on the external mission at hand, 
vice internal housekeeping arrangements. 
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3. Class VIII (Medical) -- A Special Case 
In keeping with their tradition of being exceptionally 
capable of independent operations, NMCBs have acquired 
organic medical and dental capabilities that far exceed 
their requirements when serving with MAGTFs. While regular 
Marine Corps battalions have an organic medical capability 
essentially consisting of advanced emergency first-aid and 
routine sick call requirements (Echelon 1), NMCBs have 
additional capability commonly referred to as Echelon 1(+). 
These increased capabilities include x-ray, surgical and 
dental capabilities. [Ref. 3] 
The deleterious effects of the NMCB's excess capability 
are greatly magnified when the Seabees are operating with 
MAGTFs. The negative effects are manifested in unbalanced 
medical personnel assignments and the burden of maintaining 
a medical capability in excess of what is required by an 
organization of their size and mission. [Ref. 3] 
a. Unbalanced Personnel Assignments 
Table 3-7 compares the medical personnel assigned 
to an NMCB of approximately 750 personnel to a Marine Corps 
Engineering Support Battalion (ESB) of approximately 1100 
personnel. 
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Military Number Number 
Grade Occupational Title Assigned Assigned 
Specialty to NMCB to ESB 
Off Enl Off Enl 
03 2105 General Medical Doctor 1 0 1 0 
03 2205 General Dental Officer 1 0 0 0 
E7 8425/8404 Independent Duty Corpsman/FMF 0 1 0 1 
E6 8707 FMF Dental Tech 0 1 0 0 
E6 8425/8404 FMF Dental Tech 0 1 0 0 
E5 8707 FMF Dental Tech 0 1 0 0 
E5 8506 Lab Tech 0 1 0 0 
E5 8432/8404 Preventive Med Tech/FMF 0 1 0 0 
E5 8425/8404 Independent Duty Corpsman/FMF 0 1 0 0 
E5 8404 FMF Corpsman 0 1 0 13 
E5 0000 General Duty Corpsman 0 1 0 0 
E4 8451/8404 X-Ray Technician/FMF 0 1 0 0 
E4 8404 FMF Corpsman 0 1 0 0 
E3 0000 General Duty Corpsman 0 1 0 0 
Total 2 12 1 14 
Table 3-7. Med1cal Personnel Ass1gned to NMCBs vs ESBs 
While initially the number of medical personnel in 
an NMCB seems to be proportionately larger than the number 
of medical personnel assigned to an ESB, evaluation of their 
Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) shows that the NMCB is 
at a significant disadvantage in dealing with the everyday 
medical situations likely to be experienced in a general 
engineering support battalion. [Ref. 3] 
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The disadvantage results because the NMCB is 
designed to have a significant capability in many areas of 
medical and dental support (e.g., a physician, a dentist, an 
x-ray technician, and a lab technician), but at the 
sacrifice of proportionately lesser depth in the critical 
area of hospital corpsmen that can handle everyday medical 
requirements. This results in the NMCB being overstaffed 
for serious medical conditions and dental requirements, and 
understaffed for routine sick calls and general medical 
requirements when compared to a relatively equivalent Marine 
component of the MAGTF. [Ref. 3] 
b. Medical/Dental Equipment 
Sensitive medical equipment such as x-ray machines 
and the environmental requirements for surgery and dental 
work can cause the NMCB to be detracted from their core 
mission of providing general engineering support, and be 
inwardly focused on internal establishment of their base 
camp. [Ref. 3] 
In the best case, these specialized pieces of 
equipment require extreme care in handling and environmental 
protection and provide little or no improvement in medical 
and dental care than could be provided directly from the 
MAGTF. As the Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, 
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U.S. Pacific Fleet stated in his letter to the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OP-44): 
Many medical supplies in the TOA are geared to a 
surgically staffed battalion aid station. Battalions are 
staffed with general medical officers (GMOs) who are unable 
to perform surgery. Modern medical evacuation procedures 
provide quick access to fleet hospital and surgical ·support 
units. Certain items in the NMCB TOA (e.g., cranial and 
orthopedic surgery equipment) are only used by surgeons and 
are of no use to a battalion supporting a MEF. Deleting 
these extra items would reduce the weight and cube of the 
medical TOA to allow for other items either for medical or 
other battalion functions. [Ref. 12] 
Conversations with medical personnel with the 
Second Naval Construction Brigade at Norfolk, Virginia have 
indicated that in the worst case, these specialized pieces 
of equipment require precious resources to be invested in 
attempting to create appropriate operating environments, but 
fail to perform effectively and NMCB personnel still end up 
relying on the MAGTF for advanced medical and dental 
requirements. [Ref. 3] 
c. Footprint 
Alignment of AMALs/ADALs to the equivalent of the 
MAGTFs ESB would result in a further reduction of the 
footprint of the NMCB, and increased mobility through not 
having to establish specialized environmental habitats for 
surgical and dental procedures. Table 3-8 shows the weight 
and space that the present NMCB organization requires. 
Table 3-9 shows the weight and space required by an ESB. 
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I AMAL/ ADAL I Title I Weight I Cube I 
0260 Air Echelon Dental 1,798 lbs. 139 cu. ft. 
0305 Air Detachment Equipment 1,030 lbs. 117 cu. ft. 
0306 Air Detachment Consumables 668 lbs. 53 cu.ft. 
0307 Air Echelon Equipment 6,629 lbs 776 cu. ft. 
0308 Air Echelon Consumable 2,563 lbs. 184 cu. ft. 
TOTAL NMCB AMALs/ADALs 12,689 lbs. 1,270 cu.ft. 
Table 3-8. NMCB AMAL/ADAL We1.ght and Volume 
AMAL/ADAL Title Weight Cube 
636 Aid Station Supply 1,232 lbs. 104 cu. ft. 
637 Preventive Medicine 1,435 lbs. 92 cu.ft. 
Equipment 
TOTAL ESB AMALs 2,667 lbs. 196 cu.ft. 
Table 3-9. ESB AMAL We1.ght and Volume 
Comparison of the two tables shows that 
significant savings would be realized in both weight 
(embarkation lift requirement) and volume (footprint) if the 
NMCB were to adopt the AMAL allowance of an ESB, vice the 
AMAL/ADAL allowance they currently follow. The weight 
savings of slightly more than 10,000 pounds per NMCB saves 
almost an entire C-141B lift requirement for the four NMCBs 
normally supporting a MEF. Additionally, adoption of the 
ESB AMAL allowance would save more than 1,000 cubic feet of 
space, which results in a significant reduction in the 
NMCBs' footprint. 
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d. Cost Savings 
Of additional significance is the several million 
dollars of savings that results from NMCBs being brought 
into line with ESBs for medical equipment. Table 3-10 below 
lists the Authorized Medical Allowance Lists (AMALS) and 
Authorized Dental Allowance Lists (ADALS) for an NMCB. 
Table 3-11 shows the equivalent AMAL/ADAL list for an ESB. 
Allowance Title Qty Dollar Value 
List 
#0260 NMCB Air Echelon Dental 1 $51,837.00 
#0305 NMCB Air Detachment (Equipment) 1 8,224.00 
#0306 NMCB Air Detachment ( Consumables) 1 27,730.00 
#0307 NMCB Air Echelon (Equipment) 1 49,838.00 
#0308 NMCB Air Echelon ( Consumables) 1 121,501.00 
I TOTAL I NMCB AMALs/ADALs I 5 I $269,130.001 






Qty I Dollar Value I 
List 
636 Aid Station Supply 1 $14,339.91 
637 Preventive Medicine Equipment 1 18,004.96 
TOTAL ESB AMALs 2 $32,344.87 
Table 3-11. ESB AMAL LJ.sting 
The difference in dollar value for AMALs and ADALs 
for each NMCB is $236,785 ($269,130- $32,345 = $236,785). 
With four NMCBs typically supporting a MEF, the savings 
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realized would be almost a million dollars. Total savings 
to the NCF would be almost five million dollars since there 
are 8 active and 12 reserve NMCBs. [Ref. 3] 
These savings reflect the initial reduction in 
equipment and consumables. Even more significant savings 
would be realized over time through more effective 
utilization of medical personnel (especially physicians, 
dentists, x-ray technicians and laboratory technicians) and 
equipment (x-ray, surgical, and dental equipment). [Ref. 3] 
Additional savings would be realized through 
greatly reduced requirements to manage items within the 
AMALs and ADALs. As medical personnel can attest, the 
management of delicate medical equipment and short shelf-
life consumables within the AMALs/ADALs is a constant, 
demanding procedure that requires a great deal of time. 
Short shelf-life items that are not properly managed must be 
disposed of and then replaced at additional cost. Equipment 
that requires replacement through damage or obsolescence 
adds additional significant expense to the maintenance of 
AMALs/ADALs, without a corresponding increase in mission 
performance. [Ref. 8] 
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4. No Common Item Support 
a. Doctrine and Policy 
The TOR Agreement and more recent publications 
such as the FMFM 13-4/NWP 29-9 require that the Seabees 
establish and maintain their own Class IX (repair parts) 
sustainment. This requirement fails to take advantage of 
the tremendous potential for common item support available 
through the resources of the MAGTF. 
A 1994 evaluation of a NMCB TOA by the 2nd Supply 
Battalion at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, determined that 
more than 43% of the NSNs on the NMCB TOA were common to the 
Marine Corps. Since that time the Seabees have moved even 
further towards commonality with the Marine Corps with the 
decision to adopt the same standard service pistol, service 
rifle, and communication equipment suites. [Ref. 13] 
The Combat Engineering Support Office (CESO) at 
Port Hueneme, California, is currently studying the TOAs to 
identify ways to improve commonality even further. Although 
commonality is not possible for many of the CESE items that 
are unique to the Seabees' engineering responsibilities 
(such as well drilling and asphalt laying equipment), there 
are many items the MAGTF is able to provide. [Ref. 8] 
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b. Procedure 
Seabee procedure calls for utilizing a Seabee-
unique microcomputer based system called MicroSNAP 
(Microcomputer Shipboard Non-Tactical Automated data 
Processing system) for creating requisitions for Class IX 
(Repair Parts) items. MicroSNAP provides Seabee units with 
the ability to create standard requisition formats that can 
be transmitted via satellite to the U.S. Navy facility 
supporting the unit, which then forwards the requisition to 
the appropriate source of supply. [Ref. 14] 
Marine Corps units also utilize a microcomputer 
capable system, which they call ATLASS (Asset Tracking for 
Logistics and Supply System) . Efforts by the Supply 
Department of the Third Naval Construction Brigade (NCB), 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the Operations Sections of the 
Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit 
(SMU) of 1st Supply Battalion at Camp Pendleton, California, 
have demonstrated the feasibility of MAGTFs providing common 
item support for Seabee units by utilizing MicroSNAP 
generated requisitions processed through ATLASS. [Ref. 15] 
Tests performed in October and November of 1996 
utilizing a small set of standard documents provided by the 
Third NCB to the 1st Supply Battalion SMU substantiated that 
identification of readily available common items can be 
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easily performed. This allows Seabee units serving with 
MAGTFs to have their requisitions initially screened by the 
MAGTF supporting supply detachment for common parts. [Ref. 
15] 
5. System Incompatibilities 
Although the testing determined that providing common 
item support through the processing of standard requisitions 
was feasible, it did identify problems with the 
establishment of back orders and their status. The tests 
identified that the primary problem arises from format 
incompatibilities between MicroSNAP and ATLASS. Smaller 
problems are caused by the Marine Corps not being a 
registered user of many of the Seabee requested items, and 
also by the Marine Corps not recognizing NMCBs as authorized 
using units. None of these problems are insurmountable. 
[Ref. 15] 
Ultimately, the Operations Section of the 1st Supply 
Battalion SMU hopes to be able to accept requisitions from 
Seabee units, fill requisitions for common items directly 
from stock on hand, and pass requisitions for non-common 
items directly through their supporting agencies to the 
appropriate source of supply. This will relieve the Seabees 
of seeking common item support from one source and then 
48 
establishing a separate sustainment chain for non-common 
items. [Ref. 15] 
The problem of system incompatibility has also received 
attention at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Installations 
and Logistics, (Code LPS) . The Information Systems Branch 
of that office is developing a future version of ATLASS that 
is intended to provide a common operating environment that 
would be compatible with all of the various services supply 
management systems. Conversations with ATLASS developers at 
the Information Systems Branch indicate they are working on 
a follow-on version of ATLASS that is intended to be able to 
function as a standard system compatible with all branches 
of the service. [Ref. 16] This new version will allow for 
processing of requisitions created by MicroSNAP within the 
ATLASS environment, including establishment of back orders 
and status. It is expected that this system will begin 
field testing in calendar year 1997. [Ref. 17] 
49 
50 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT PRACTICES FOR 
NCF IN SUPPORT OF MAGTF OPERATIONS 
A. STATUS QUO 
There are three areas examined in this thesis that 
characterize logistics support for the Seabees: they are a 
robust organization in terms of medical support, they deploy 
with a robust initial sustainment capability, and when 
deployed with MAGTFs they depend on an independently 
established supply chain for Class IX support. 
1. Robust Organization 
The medical capability of a Seabee battalion exceeds 
that of a comparable battalion in the Marine Corps operating 
as part of a MAGTF. This extensive medical capability is 
appropriate for Seabee units that are operating 
independently of MAGTF support. When the Seabees are 
operating with MAGTFs this extended medical capability is 
not required for them to accomplish their assigned missions. 
Indeed, it is an expensive, heavy, manpower-intensive 
requirement that detracts from the accomplishment of their 
core general engineering missions. [Refs. 3 & 8] 
2. Robust Sustainment 
The Seabees deploy with extensive initial sustainment 
capability in Class I (Rations), Class II (General 
Supplies), Class III (Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants), Class 
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IV (Construction Materials), Class V (Ammunition) and Class 
IX (Repair Parts) supply items. This capability is critical 
in situations where the Seabees deploy without any 
established sustainment support available. [Ref. 18] 
In the case of Seabees operating with MAGTFs however, 
initial sustainment capability is not required. In their 
role of providing general engineering support, the Seabees 
do not arrive in the area of operation until after the MAGTF 
has already established sustainment for all classes of 
supply. [Ref. 10] 
Once again, a capability that is a critical requirement 
when the Seabees are operating independently becomes a 
liability when operating with MAGTFs. As Table 3-5 shows, 
sustainment material for the NMCBs in support of a MEF, not 
including Class IX (Repair Parts), requires the equivalent 
of more than 46 C-141B airlifts. 
3. Independent Sustainment Chain for Class IX 
When operating with MAGTFs, the Seabees receive Class 
I, Class II, Class III, Class IV, and Class V sustainment 
support from the MAGTF when their initial supplies are 
expended. In the case of Class IX (Repair Parts) items, the 
Seabees continue to establish a requisition and sustainment 
chain direct from themselves to the nearest supporting U.S. 
Navy facility. This facility passes requisitions to the 
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appropriate sources of supply. This is a practice that is 
carried over from Seabee procedures utilized when NMCBs 
operate independently. [Ref. 19] 
This policy has two significant shortcomings: it does 
not allow the Seabees to take advantage of potential common 
items that are available from the MAGTF, nor does it take 
advantage of the extensive sustainment resupply chain that 
the MAGTF has already established. 
B. ALTERNATIVE POLICIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Throughout their history the Seabees have demonstrated 
they provide a critical and unique engineering capability to 
the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and other agencies of the U.S. 
government. While history has shown the "Can Do" spirit of 
the Seabees will carry the day, it is a policy that can be 
inefficient. The Seabees can continue to provide a high 
capability of general engineering support without any 
changes to their policies or organization. As with any 
organization, however, there are improvements that can be 
made that could make the Seabees an even more viable 
engineering component in the mobile MAGTF force structures 
of the 21st Century. 
The following paragraphs provide alternative policies 
or organizational changes that could allow the Seabees to 
maintain their present general engineering capabilities when 
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operating with MAGTFs, while enhancing their mobility, 
decreasing their footprint and making them an even more 
relevant force for the future. 
1. Receive all sustainment from the Marine Corps with 
the exception of Non-Common Class IX (Repair 
Parts) 
The Seabee TOAs include thousands of pounds of 
sustainment items that are available directly from the 
MAGTF. To be able to take advantage of these items, the 
Seabees must only ensure that their requirements are 
coordinated with the MAGTF they are operating with. [Ref. 
15] 
Although a few days of sustainment supplies are a 
significant burden to the Seabees as they deploy, for the 
MAGTF they would be just another small piece of the larger 
sustainment chain they would already have established. The 
additional burden of providing sustainment to the Seabees as 
soon as they arrive would not be a significant problem to 
the MAGTF since their sustainment chain would already be in 
place. [Ref. 15] 
The Seabees could receive several benefits from this 
change. An immediate benefit would be that it would greatly 
simplify their preparations for embarkation. Sustainment 
items are generally the most challenging items to prepare 
for embarkation. Most of the sustainment material needs to 
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first be collected before it can be prepared for 
embarkation. By eliminating sustainment items from their 
embarkation requirements, the Seabees would be able to 
concentrate on the preparation of their personnel and 
equipment. [Refs. 8 & 11] 
An additional benefit of not taking the more than 
500,000 pounds of sustainment material with them would be 
that the Seabees could realize greater mobility. Instead of 
being concerned with where to store their sustainment items, 
they would be able to focus on their personnel and 
equipment. While much of the sustainment material would be 
consumed in a matter of days and would not be a lingering 
burden, some material, especially ammunition, would be a 
burden until it is expended or turned into an established 
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) for storage. In either case, 
the Seabees would be better off embarking only the minimum 
basic load prescribed by the MAGTF commander and drawing 
resupply as required from the MAGTF. 
Another significant advantage the Seabees would realize 
by not deploying with initial sustainment would be a greatly 
reduced footprint. When first arriving into an area of 
operations, secure areas can be at a premium. Seabee 
sustainment items as planned require more than 15,000 cubic 
feet of storage area. Of greater concern is that this 
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figure does not include the obvious additional areas that 
would be required to allow separate storage areas for items 
such as rations, petroleum, oils, lubricants, and 
explosives. Management of such a large area of sustainment 
supplies requires considerable resources in both planning 
and execution. [Ref. 8] 
2. Realign Medical Capability 
A Seabee unit's medical capabilities do not match their 
requirements when operating with MAGTFs. During independent 
operations, the Seabees must have access to medical and 
dental support in many situations. When operating with 
MAGTFs, these resources are readily available from the 
Medical and Dental Battalions of the Force Service Support 
Groups. [Ref. 3] 
Seabee medical sections should be organized similar to 
equivalent Marine Corps units. As the comparison in Table 
3-7 demonstrates, Marine Corps engineer battalions in the 
Force Service Support Group (FSSG) are not assigned dentists 
on their Table of Organization (T/0) and have a heavier 
compliment of general duty corpsmen. Although Marine Corps 
engineer support battalions are assigned physicians on their 
T/O's, in many cases these physicians fill a general support 
role within the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) and do 
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not physically operate with the engineer support battalion. 
[Ref. 20] 
As currently manned, NMCBs are provided physicians, 
dentists and technicians at the expense of general duty 
corpsmen. In virtually all situations, a general duty 
corpsmen could provide more utility to the NMCB than a 
physician, a dentist and a few technicians to care for 
equipment. Through strength in numbers the additional 
corpsmen could increase the availability and quality of sick 
call and preventive medical programs to the Seabees. In 
those cases where a physician or dentist is required, the 
Seabees would be able to receive support from the same 
physicians and dentists that the MAGTF does. [Ref. 3] 
The Seabees would also recognize a significant 
improvement in their unit's mobility. Medical equipment, 
such as x-ray machines and surgical units, must be handled 
carefully and requires special operating conditions [Ref. 
3]. As Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 show, medical and dental 
equipment and supplies for an NMCB weigh over 10,000 pounds 
more than that in a comparable Marine Corps battalion. 
Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 also show that the NMCB requires 
more than 1,000 additional cubic feet of footprint space 
than a comparable Marine Corps battalion does. [Ref. 8] 
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3. Request Common Item Support from MAGTF 
As previously discussed in Chapter III, ATLASS has the 
ability to process requisitions created in MicroSNAP to 
identify any available common items held by the MAGTF. [Ref. 
15] To benefit from these MAGTF-held common items the 
Seabees only need to submit their MicroSNAP generated 
requisitions to the MAGTF's deployed supply support unit. 
Available common items would be recognized by the MAGTF and 
provided to the Seabees. Those items either not available 
or requiring a back order would be returned to the Seabees 
for submission through the normal U.S. Navy supply chain. 
[Ref. 15] 
4. Adopt Marine Corps' ATLASS 
The current system compatibility problems that were 
discussed in Chapter III do not allow the Seabees to utilize 
MicroSNAP to establish back orders through the MAGTF, nor do 
they allow the MAGTF to provide status for back orders to 
the Seabees. These problems can be eliminated by the 
Seabees adoption of the Marine Corps ATLASS when operating 
with MAGTFs. 
Adoption of ATLASS as an adjunct system with MicroSNAP 
would allow the Seabees to submit all of their requisitions 
for processing through the MAGTF. In addition to receiving 
common item support, the Seabees would benefit from the 
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extensive logistic support chain the Marine Corps has 
already established to provide for resupply of non-available 
items. This would greatly reduce the logistical problems 
the Seabees have in trying to establish their own logistic 
chain for back ordered items from their Construction 
Battalion Centers (CBCs) in Gulf Port, Mississippi, and Port 
Hueneme, California. Experience from Operations Desert 
Shield, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope has shown that the 
Seabees are at a significant disadvantage when competing 
with the other services for strategic lift of supplies. 
Because of the limited number of items they require for 
sustainment compared to other organizations the Seabees are 
not able to reserve dedicated air lift support. By 
coordinating resupply of back orders directly with the MAGTF 
the Seabees would gain the benefits of the already 
established MAGTF logistic chain and not have to compete 
with the other services for the limited lift support. 
[Refs. 8 & 19] 
Also of significance is that Seabee requisitions would 
be prioritized in accordance with the MAGTF commander's 
directives if the Seabees utilized ATLASS. Rather than have 
Seabee requisitions competing with Navy organizations, they 
would be competing with other equivalent components of the 
MAGTF. [Ref. 15] 
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The drawbacks of this approach are two-fold. First, it 
would require additional training of personnel. Second, 
utilizing two systems would complicate the management of 
requisitions and increase the likelihood of errors. 
The first problem is mitigated by the recognition that 
the Seabees only need to use the requisitioning based 
modules of ATLASS, which can be nominally learned in a 
matter of several hours [Ref. 16]. Additionally,· assistance 
would be readily available from the MAGTF supply support 
unit [Ref. 15]. 
The second problem can be mitigated by conscientious 
management procedures. Although it is an additional 
management burden, the benefits of gaining the support of 
the MAGTF supply chain should outweigh the additional 
management burdens caused by having an additional system. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND REC01'-:1MENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Historical ties between the Seabees and the U.S. Marine 
Corps have always been strong, and are growing even 
stronger. In previous years a weak argument could be made 
that much of what the Seabees did simply duplicated what 
Marine Corps engineer units did. With the era of downsizing 
and reengineering upon us, this is clearly no longer the 
case. 
More than ever, the Marine Corps depends on the Seabees 
to be a critical and complimentary engineering component of 
the MAGTF. With much of the Marine Corps engineer 
capability lost through force reduction, the Marine Corps 
now looks directly to the Seabees to fill the void. 
The Seabees are now actively included in operations 
plans for major contingencies. Two critical engineer 
missions required by the MAGTF are now the responsibility of 
the Seabees: disassembly and transportation of mobile 
bridging assets to forward areas for re-emplacement by 
Marine engineers, and expansion of Expeditionary Airfield 
runway aprons. These missions are in addition to the 
general engineering responsibilities the Seabees have always 
had, such as well drilling and asphalt laying. [Refs. 2 & 
10] 
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With the Seabees now playing a critical role in the 
MAGTF, their ability to effectively operate in the same 
environment as their Marine counterparts is crucial as well. 
Being mobile and maintaining a minimal footprint are two of 
the prime considerations for expected success in future 
contingencies. [Ref. 2] 
Inclusion of sustainment items in the Seabees Tables of 
Allowance (TOA) when deploying with MAGTFs decreases the 
Seabees mobility and increases their footprint. In most 
cases, equipment designated for the Air Echelon is relegated 
to a Sea Echelon, simply because the aircraft lift 
requirements for an NMCB are so great. [Ref. 8] 
Elimination of these sustainment items would reduce the 
lift requirements of the NMCB by almost 10%, or the 
equivalent of almost 12 C-141B aircraft per NMCB. With four 
NMCBs notionally assigned to each MEF, the MEF aircraft lift 
requirement for the Air Detachments and Air Echelons would 
be reduced more than 46 C-141B aircraft loads. However, it 
is likely that much of this material would be relegated to 
sea lift because of the overall weight of an NMCB and the 
limited aircraft lift that would be available. This point 
provides even greater reason for seeking ways to efficiently 
reduce the lift requirement for Seabee units. 
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Of equal concern is the significant footprint 
associated with managing these sustainment items. While the 
sustainment items approximate 10% of the weight of an NMCB, 
they occupy more than 27% of the volume. This expands the 
footprint of the NMCB significantly. The footprint effect 
for sustainment items can actually be expected to be even 
greater than the cubic volume they occupy for embarkation 
purposes. Rations, POL, and explosives all require special 
storage considerations. In contingencies where secure areas 
are at a premium, the space these items require is one more 
challenge that works to detract from the Seabee's primary 
mission of general engineering support. 
Additional efficiencies could be gained from providing 
common item support for those Class IX (Repair Parts) items 
that are available from the MAGTF. While a standard DoD 
supply support system is not yet available, cooperation and 
coordination could minimize the impact of an imperfect 
system until a viable standard system is available. [Ref. 
15] 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. MAGTFs Provide Seabees All Sustainment Except Non-
Common Class IX (Repair Parts) 
This recommendation is virtually identical to present 
doctrine with the critical exception that it does not 
require the Seabees to deploy with several days of 
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sustainment in several classes of supply. Providing 
sustainment for Seabees operating with the MAGTF is a 
responsibility the Marine Corps has accepted. Whether this 
requirement begins the day the Seabees arrive to the area of 
operations, or five days later does not significantly alter 
the sustainment support requirements for the MAGTF. [Ref. 
15] 
It must also be recognized that the Seabees could still 
be faced with contingencies where they may not be operating 
with the support of MAGTFs and would be required to deploy 
with substantial levels of sustainment. [Ref. 18] 
2. Reorganization of Medical Section 
The Seabees clearly have a requirement for medical and 
dental support when operating independently from other 
supporting agencies. When operating with MAGTFs, however, 
the extensive medical and dental capabilities of each NMCB 
equips them well for major medical events, but poorly for 
routine sick call and preventive medicine requirements. 
[Ref. 3] 
Alignment in accordance with a comparable Marine Corps 
organization such as an Engineer Support Battalion would 
free up physicians and dentists to the field medical 
facilities, and eliminate the requirement for the Seabees to 
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manage surgical and dental equipment in often imposing 
environmental conditions. [Ref. 3] 
3. Conduct Field Testing of Marine Corps' ATLASS to 
Determine its Suitability for Use with Seabees 
Operating with MAGTFs 
This recommendation has potential near-term and long-
term benefits. In the near-term, ATLASS offers an immediate 
opportunity for the Seabees to benefit from the extensive 
supply support chain that the MAGTF establishes. In 
addition to common item support, the Seabees would be able 
to have requisitions passed to the appropriate source of 
supply by the MAGTF without the need to resubmit the 
requisition through the Navy. [Ref. 15] 
In the long-term, a follow-on version of ATLASS 
promises to provide the potential to meet the requirements 
of the Marines and the Seabees for a standard system. 
Seabee familiarity with an earlier version of ATLASS would 
allow for an informed evaluation of the abilities of the 
ATLASS system when the follow-on version does arrive. [Ref. 
17] 
4. Aggressively Pursue Field Exercises with MAGTFs 
The relationship between the Seabees and MAGTFs 
continues to evolve and be refined almost daily. Just as 
the Marine Corps is adjusting to the reduction in its 
organic engineer capabilities, the Seabees are adjusting to 
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their new position as a crucial component of the MAGTF 
engineer mix. While Seabees deploy extensively as 
independent battalions, participating in field exercises 
with actual MAGTFs could provide valuable experience to both 
the Seabees and the MAGTF concerning how to best operate 
together. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Optimum Organization of Naval Construction Forces 
Operating with MAGTFs 
The success of the Seabees over the years can largely 
be attributed to the extensive planning and preparation they 
have employed in the ABFCs and TOAs, and as exhibited by 
each battalion being assigned a physician and a dentist. 
While these systems are excellent tools for independent 
operations with known mission requirements, they appear to 
be inappropriate for the roles and missions Seabees could be 
expected to fill when operating with MAGTFs. A careful 
evaluation of the organization of an NMCB may identify other 
areas where the Seabees have an excess or inappropriate 
capability for their missions with MAGTFs. 
2. Dedicate Selected NMCBs to Support of MAGTFs 
Each NMCB is challenged by their peacetime missions 
which require substantial independent capabilities, and by 
their contingency missions with the Navy, Marine Corps or 
other DoD agencies. The Marine Corps routinely meets such 
66 
challenges by "task organizing" to meet the requirements at 
hand. For the Marine Corps, "task organizing" is simply 
identifying the requirements for a task or mission and 
organizing appropriately for the mission by piecing together 
the required components from all of the units. This 
provides the Marine Corps great flexibility in adjusting to 
any possible contingency. The Seabees, because they are a 
small, unique part of the U.S. Navy, cannot call upon other 
organizations within the Navy to support them when they are 
called to a mission. The question is, since all of the 
services have been subject to severe cutbacks in personnel 
and resources, might it be prudent to task some NMCBs with 
the primary responsibility of training for, and supporting 
MAGTF operations? These units could potentially be leaner 
in personnel and equipment, and specifically organized to 
support those missions associated with the MAGTF's 
requirements. Other NMCBs could remain robust and capable 
of extensive independent operations. 
3. Optimum Commonality of Equipment 
As a result of their years of independent assignments, 
the Seabees have assembled a unique collection of civil 
engineering support equipment. In a "joint" world where 
each of the services is responsible for supporting or is 
dependent on the support of other branches at one time or 
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another, uniqueness is a significant liability. Evaluation 
of the Seabees' civil engineering support equipment could 
identify those areas where common equipment could be 
employed and still meet their mission requirements. 
68 
APPENDIX A. COMPARISON OF ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES 
LEGEND OF TASK PRIORITY AND CAPABILITY CODES 
First Letter: p Primary Task Responsibility 
Second Letter: s Secondary Task Responsibility 
H Heavy Capability 
M Medium Capability 
N Not an assigned Task 
L Light Capability 
N No Capability 
TASKS, CAPABILITIES, AND SOURCES OF SUPPORT 
NCF CEB ESB MWSS CIV 
GENERAL ENGINEERING TASKS (CSS) 
Conduct Engineer Reconnaissance PM SM PM PL PM 
Surveying and Drafting PH SL PM PL NL 
Plan Construction/Repair/Maintenance of Camps PH SL PH PM SL 
Improve Beaches PH SL PH NL NN 
Construct Standard/Nonstandard Bridges PH SL PH NN NL 
Improve Unpaved Roads/Airstrips/Marshaling Areas PH SL PH SL NM 
Perform Rapid Runway Repair PH NN SM PM NL 
Repair/Improve Bare Base Existing Airfields PH NN PH PM NH 
Build Expedient Airfields (Matting) PH NN PH SL NN 
Plan and Estimate Projects PH PM PH PM PM 
Materials Testing (Engineering Properties) PH SL PM PL PH 
Soil Stabilization PH SL PH PL NM 
Construct Aircraft Revetment/Dispersal Sites PH NL SH PM NL 
Repair Airfield Damage PH NL PH PM SM 
Engineering Design (Deliberate) PH NL PH SL SM 
Perform Pile Driving Operations PM NN PM SL SM 
Repair War Damage PH NL NM NL PM 
Drill Wells PH NN NN NN SM 
Construct Semi-Permanent Camps PH NL PH SL SM 
Erect Pre-Engineered Structures PH NL PH PL SM 
Construct Hard-Surfaced Storage/Staging/Marshaling 
Areas PH NN NN NN SL 
Perform Vertical Construction (Including Concrete) PH NL PM PL SM 
Asphalt Roads PH NN NN NN SM 
Operate Base Central Power Plants PM NN NN NN SM 
Perform Base Maintenance PH NL SM SL SM 
Concrete Production Operations PH NN NL NL SM 
Asphalt Production Operations PH NN NN NN SM 
Perform Quarry Operations PH NL SM NL SM 
Perform Rock Crusher Operations PH NN SM NN SM 
Construct Logistical Support Bases PH NL PH NL SM 
Construct Airbases PH NN PH NN PM 
Construct/Repair Port/Waterfront Structures PH NL NM NL PM 
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NCF CEB ESB MWSS CIV 
GENERAL ENGINEERING TASKS (CSS) (cont.) 
Employ Specialized Demolitions NL PH SH NL NN 
Conduct Nonexplosive Demolition and Obstacle/Debris 
Removal PH NL PH NL PH 
Provide Technical Engineer Advice PH NL PH PM PH 
Fight as Infantry SL NM SL NN NN 
Provide Tactical Water/Hygiene Services SL SL PH PM NL 
Provide Tactical Electrical Service SM SL PH PM NN 
Develop Sewage and Water Systems PM NN NL NL PM 
Provide Tactical Bulk Fuel Storage/Dispensing PH NN PH PM SL 
MILITARY TASKS (CS) 
Conduct Engineer Reconnaissance NL PM PM PL NN 
Breach Obstacles NL PH SM NL NL 
Construct Pioneer Roads SH PH SH SL NL 
Assault Bridging NN PL SL NN NN 
Clear Mines NN PH SH SL NN 
Clear Helicopter Landing Sites SH PM PH SL NL 
Improve Beaches PH PH SH NN NN 
Employ Specialized Demolitions SM PH SH NL NN 
Provide Technical Engineer Advice SH PH NH PH NN 
Fight as Infantry NL SM NL NN NN 
COUNTERMOBILITY TASKS (CS) 
Conduct Engineer Reconnaissance NL PM PM PL NN 
Place Mines NN PH SH SL NN 
Plan/Install Obstacles and Barriers SL PH SH SL NN 
Employ Specialized Demolitions NL PH SH NL NN 
Provide Technical Engineer Advice SH PH SH PH NN 
Fight as Infantry SL SM NL NN NN 
SURVI~ILITY TASKS (CS) 
Construct Field Fortifications SH PH PH PM NL 
Employ Specialized Demolitions SM PH PH NL NN 
Provide Technical Engineer Advice NL PH PH PH NN 
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APPENDIX B. CLASSES OF SUPPLY 
Class I 
Subsistence including gratuitous health and welfare items. 
Subclassifications for class I are: 
A-air (in-flight rations) 
R-refrigerated subsistence 
S-non-refrigerated subsistence (less combat rations) 
C-combat rations (including gratuitous health and welfare 
items. 
Class II 
Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool 
sets and tool kits, hand tools, administrative and housekeeping 
supplies and equipment. 
Subclassifications for class II are: 
B-ground support material 
E-general supplies 
F-clothing and textiles 
M-weapons 
T-industrial supplies (including bearings, block and tackle, 
cable, chain, wire rope, screws, bolts, studs, steel 
rods, plates, and bars) . 
Class III 
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants; petroleum fuels, 
lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquid 
and compressed gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicing 
and antifreeze compounds, together with components and additives 
of such products; and coal. 





Construction: construction materials to include installed 
equipment and all fortification/barrier materials. 
No subclassifications. 
Class V 
Ammunition: ammunition of all types (including chemical, 
biological, radiological, and special weapons), bombs, 
explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, 
rockets, propellants, and other associated items. 




Personal demand items (nonmilitary sales items). 
No subclassifications. 
Class VII 
Major end items: a final combination of end products which 
is ready for its intended use, e.g., launchers, tanks, mobile 
machines shops, and vehicles. 
Subclassifications for class VII are: 
A-air 
B-ground support material (includes power generators and 
construction, barrier, bridging, fire fighting, 
petroleum, and mapping equipment) 
D-adroinistrative vehicles (commercial vehicles used in 








Medical material including medical unique repair parts. 
Subclassifications are: 
A-medical/dental material, less blood and blood products 
B-blood and blood products 
Class IX 
Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies and 
subassemblies, reparable and nonreparable, required for 
maintenance support of all equipment. 
Subclassifications for class IX are: 
A-air 
B-ground support material (includes power generators and 
construction, barrier, bridging, fire fighting, 
petroleum, and mapping equipment) 
D-administrative vehicles (commercial vehicles used in 






T-industrial supplies (includes bearings, block and tackle, 
cable, chain, wire rope, screws, bolts, studs, steel 
rods, plates, and bars) . 
Class X 
Material to support nonmilitary programs, e.g., agricultural 
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